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Abstract
Financial crises appear throughout human history. While there are many schools
of thought on what the actual causes of such crises are, it has been suggested that
the creation of credit money might be a source of financial instability. We
discuss how the credit mechanism in a system of fractional reserve banking leads
to non-local transfers of purchasing power that also affect non-involved agents.
To overcome this issue, we impose the local symmetry of time homogeneity on
the monetary system. A bi-currency system of non-bank assets (money) and
bank assets (antimoney) is considered. A payment is either made by passing on
money or by receiving antimoney. As a result, a free floating exchange rate
between non-bank assets and bank assets is established. Credit creation is
replaced by the simultaneous transfer of money and antimoney at a negotiated
exchange rate. This is in contrast to traditional discussions of full reserve
banking, which stalls creditary lending. With money and antimoney, the pro-
blem of credit crunches is mitigated while a full time symmetry of the monetary
system is maintained. As a test environment for such a monetary system, we
discuss an economy of random transfers. Random transfers are a strong criterion
to probe the stability of monetary systems. The analysis using statistical physics
provides analytical solutions and confirms that a money–antimoney system
could be functional. Equally important to the probing of the stability of such a
monetary system is the question of how to implement the credit default
dynamics. This issue remains open.
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1. Overview
The main function of money is to store information on transactions in the economy and to
establish a unit of account in the credit–debit record keeping of the banking system [1, 2]. The
symmetry properties of this economic memory are important because they entail the local
conservation laws that are postulated in much of the literature on monetary theory and the
statistical mechanics of money [3]. If a monetary space is not homogeneous in time, the money
supply is not fixed, and non-local, unwarranted transfers occur. Consequently, precise storage
of economic information is no longer guaranteed. Although these non-local interactions are
known in economics as inflation tax, their microscopic effects have largely gone unnoticed in
economics and econophysics: the mechanism by which transactions are recorded has economic
consequences for all agents. Since the money supply in real world economies is largely driven
by demand for credit, contemporary monetary systems systematically violate time homogeneity
and consequently are rather imperfect stores of economic information [2].
The statistical mechanics approach has proven highly successful in determining the global
properties of monetary systems subject to different boundary conditions [3–9]. All of this work
however contains the local conservation of money as a postulate and deals only with nominal
money, ignoring the effective redistributive taxation that comes with the creation and
annihilation of monetary units. In economics, the Friedman rule holds that a constant money
supply improves welfare, however the problem of liquidity shortages under such a regime has
not been resolved [10].
Symmetries of monetary spaces are therefore of high interest both in econophysics,
because symmetries restrict system behavior, as well as economics, because such restrictions
potentially lead to unnecessary inflexibility. But a monetary system that is homogeneous in time
would be beneficial because it would keep the money supply constant. In the following we
show how invariance under time translation and exchange of trading roles leads to conserved
quantities and present a fully symmetric toy model of a monetary system that addresses the
problem of liquidity shortages through a new type of monetary transfer.
Lacking the ability to conduct economic experiments, we then study this new economic
structure under the assumption of random transfers. Under random transfer, the stability of
economic structures can be crucially tested as the random walk tends to create inflationary
scenarios in creditary monetary systems [7, 11]. We can derive a number of analytical solutions
for such a time symmetric monetary system for the case of random transfers.
2. Background
The origin of money and even a correct definition of money are still subject to debate [12, 13].
Most economic textbooks today define money by its functions. (‘Money is what money does’
[14].) It is useful to distinguish between commodity money and representative money.
Commodity money fulfills the aforementioned criteria because of a perceived intrinsic value of
the material it is made of, such as gold or silver. Representative money on the other hand is
essentially a claim on goods or services to be rendered in the future. This function heavily
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depends on social and legal measures to enforce these claims. Being a social contract, it is
independent of its physical representation, best seen in electronic payment systems.
Historically, representative money is inextricably linked to the record of debt relations
[15, 16]. If a buyer wasnʼt able to pay for a good immediately, the seller could grant him a credit
if he had sufficient trust in the economic potential of the buyer. They would record their debt
relation for example by the use of tally sticks or clay tablets [17] (see figure 1).
If the debtor was a highly visible agent with a good economic standing, they could serve as
a currency [18]. But incomplete information about the market participants and the overhead of
enforcing the claims prohibited the wide circulation of these promissory notes. It is often not
necessary for the issuer to be able to meet all his obligations at all times [19]. Most of the
creditors will then continue to use the notes in trades as they are confident that they could cash
the notes at all times if they so desired. The issuer can now create new money by
accommodating loans: he can hand out additional promissory notes to a borrower. This service
is nowadays provided by commercial banks. The money in a commercial bank account is
legally a claim on central bank money which in most countries is fiat money, i.e. money that has
been declared legal tender by government decree. The majority of financial transactions today
are carried out by commercial bank money. However, if the trust to accept the bankʼs
‘promissory notes’ is lacking, bank runs might occur. The bank will have problems finding
creditors on the interbank lending market.
One problem with the creation of money via loans is the possible devaluation of the
currency [20]. As discussed later, credit creation creates non-local transfers of purchasing power
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Figure 1. Two examples for records of debt relations which served as currencies. (a)
Tally sticks were commonly used in medieval Europe. A marked wooden stick
representing the transactional value was split into halves of different lengths. The
creditor kept the longer part (stock) and the debtor was given the shorter one (foil). The
stock represented a claim to future income and was actively traded (stock market). In
contrast to commodity money, the creation of representative money comes at virtually
no cost. (b) Clay tablets served a similar function and recorded credit money contracts.
which adversely affect net asset holders. Starting from this observation, we will propose a
monetary system of money and antimoney that remedies this deficiency and introduce a novel
mechanism for obtaining liquidity.
3. Credit creates non-local transfers of purchasing power
Consider a simplified economy of N + 1 agents where the (N + 1)th agent has gathered sufficient
trust in that the other N agents are willing to accept its promissory notes as means of payments.
We will call this agent ‘bank’. For simplicity, the bankʼs promissory notes are the only currency
in circulation. For our analysis the terms ‘promissory notes’ and ‘demand deposits’ are used
interchangeably since both represent a clientʼs claim to an underlying entity that the bank
promises to meet.
Every agent keeps a so-called T-account to record his assets in the left column and his
liabilities in the right column (cf figure 2). The agents’ assets are liabilities of the bank and
vice versa. The assets and liabilities that agent k holds at time tn are denoted ak
n( ) and lk
n( ). The
total monetary supply at time tn is
∑ ∑= =
= =













Electronic bookkeeping shall prevent monetary units from being lost or destroyed. If agent i
buys some good from agent j and they have agreed on a price Δ > 0, then agent i has several
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Figure 2. All monetary transactions can be visualized in a T-account. Here, only the
updates in the balance sheets are shown. Figure (a) shows a direct transfer of asset units
from buyer i to seller j. A payment via credit creation (b) leads to an increased money
supply and—as will be shown later—to non-local transfers of purchasing power. The
reverse process of credit annihilation (c) occurs when a creditor pays a debtor and leads
to a decrease of the total money supply. Note, of course, that credit annihilation can
only occur after credit creation.
payment options. He can directly transfer the amount Δ from his asset account to jʼs asset
account. When the trade happened between t1 and t2 and no other transactions occurred in that















The agents ≠k i j, are not involved in the trade. The liabilities are not affected. Figure 2(a)
shows the corresponding bookkeeping operation. The total money supply hasnʼt changed:
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Now, the total money supply used in trades has increased: Δ= +M M(2) (1) . We see that the





































Thus, we see that credit creation is potentially beneficial for all debtors and adversely affects all
creditors (figure 3). Only in the case of =a lk k, non-involved agents are unaffected by credit
creation. Indeed, since Δ∑ =w 0, we see that there is an indirect transfer of relative monetary
wealth from creditors to debtors.
In the case of credit annihilation (see figure 2(c)), the reverse effect occurs. As the total
money supply decreases, the sign in equation (7) is reversed. One might conjecture that both
effects somehow cancel. But it has been shown that unrestricted fractional reserve banking
leads to an increase of the money supply without bounds [7]. This is due to the fact that the
number of loans (which create asset–liability pairs) cannot be negative. In reality, bank lending
is not completely unrestricted but nevertheless a net increase of credit is confirmed by virtually
all statistics about the money supply M1 [21].
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Let us assume that agent k knows that the trade between i and j happened by credit creation
and that the transferred amount of money was Δ. If k previously charged a price Δ(0) for his
services, he might now set a new price Δ(2) to compensate for his loss of relative monetary










, (8)k k k k
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we find that the expected new price should be
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ




















which is obviously larger than Δ(0). Note that 〈 〉 = 〈 〉 =a lk k
M
N
with N being the total number of
market participants. Since the price change =Δ
Δ ( )f a l,k k
(2)
(0) is a detailed function of asset ak and
liability holdings lk, there is no global factor by which agents k could rescale their prices in order
to get back to their initial situation. A non-local transfer of wealth is the result. The reaction of
agents to inflation expectations assumes a widespread knowledge about credit creation
processes. Credit creation—ceteris paribus—leads to increasing price levels. In a real economy,
those agents who are ‘closest’ to the credit creation profit the most from it as they will still face
the old prices. This effect has already been described by Richard Cantillon in the 18th century
and has subsequently been named the Cantillon effect [22].
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Figure 3. The shift Δwk of relative asset and liability holdings that non-involved agents
experience when a trade is executed either by direct asset transfer or by credit creation.
Note that in the case of a direct transfer, non-involved agents experience no change at
all. In the case of credit creation, the agents’ relative share of assets and liabilities
decreases and thus agents with >a lk k are at a disadvantage according to equation (7).
Conversely, if <a lk k, agents profit from credit creation. It is only when agents hold the
same amount of assets and liabilities, that they are unaffected by credit creation.
Of course, credit creation is not the only source of inflation. Inflation—especially in the
short run—depends on several factors including but not limited to money supply, technological
advancement, real demand, production and stability of governments. Most economists believe
an extension of the money supply to be the prime cause for inflation in the long term [23]. The
question of the particular benefits and disadvantages of inflation is an ongoing debate. In most
countries, general price stability has become one of the major goals of monetary and fiscal
policies [24–26] and in some even the most predominant one [26]. Inflation, whether it be
anticipated or unanticipated, is costly for society due to deadweight losses [27]. For small
inflation rates (around 2%), most economists have come to consider the negative consequences
being outweighed by a range of positive effects [28–31]. These include an increased
maneuverability of central banks near the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates and the
ability for firms to counteract the downward rigidity of nominal wages. As deflation is often
considered even worse than inflation, a small rate of inflation can also serve as a buffer. A
recent working paper of the International Monetary Fund suggests that the corridor of
acceptable inflation rates might be narrower than previously thought [32]. The issue of money-
induced inflation has of course been recognized and debated, e.g. in connection with the bank
charter act of 1844 which prohibited commercial banks from issuing promissory notes [19] and
by several other authors [20, 33–38].
4. A time-homogeneous bi-currency system of money and antimoney
In order to prevent non-local transfers upon credit creation and to attenuate the Cantillon effect,
the usually proposed solutions essentially restrict credit creation by commercial banks or
prohibit it entirely [39–42]. These proposals have come to be known as narrow banking, full
reserve banking or 100% reserve banking. A very strict implementation of full reserve banking
has long been dismissed by mainstream economists, but in view of the current financial crises,
the idea has gained some traction again [43, 44]. The main criticism of full reserve banking is its
alleged inability to provide an economy with the necessary liquidity, i.e. even agents whose
creditworthiness is ensured, cannot easily obtain means of payment for future investments
[45, 46].
We have seen (figure 2) that representative money always consists of an asset–liability
pair: the asset part is the actual claim to a good or a service to be rendered in the future and the
liability part is the obligation of the debtor to provide it. Our main idea for a symmetric
monetary system is to fully separate both parts by using two monies of equal supply and
circulating the agentʼs asset units independently of the agentʼs liability units. The respective
complementary liability and asset parts are kept at a central bank.
In an analogy to physics, the asset units can be considered as money whereas liability units
are antimoney [11, 47]. The analogy is limited in this discussion since money and antimoney do
not annihilate and will only be created if agents enter or destroyed if agents leave the economy.
Demand deposits at commercial banks are to be fully backed by central bank money, i.e.
commercial banks would be prohibited from credit creation. Of course, time and investment
deposits could still be fractionally backed. In order to be able to adapt the money supply to
economic growth, the central bank would be allowed to directly regulate the amount of money
in circulation.
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Now agent i can either purchase some good from agent j by transfering Δa asset units to
him or by receiving Δl liability units along with the good. To put it briefly, in order for agents to
increase their monetary wealth, they want to obtain asset units and get rid of liability units. The
feasibility and pitfalls of such a system will be discussed in section 9. Of course, Δa and Δl do
not have to be accounted for in the same unit. The introduction of antimoney allows the market





for both payment modes. As with any two currencies, this gives rise to a
free floating exchange rate between both monies that is missing in the present system. Let us
















where a and l denote the asset and liability holdings. This is the linear extension to the definition
of real purchasing power in economic textbooks [13]. Now if a transfer is executed by either of
the two payment options and = =ΔΔe e
a
l eq
, the monetary wealth of the payee changes by






If the seller offers both payment options but asks for prices such that ≠e eeq, he is asking for a
premium for one of the payment options. For example he might ask for a premium if the buyer











In addition to the new payment option via liabilities there is now a novel, interesting way
to provide liquidity to an agent by simultaneously transferring asset and liability units to him.
Assume for a moment that both price levels are equal: =p p
a l
. Then an agent can transfer
Δ Δ=a l asset and liability units to a liquidity-seeking market participant without changing his
monetary wealth. Thus, in a symmetric monetary system as outlined above, monetary wealth
and liquidity become different notions, as illustrated in figure 4.




. If a liquidity provider P
simultaneously transfers δa asset units and δl liability units, his monetary wealth changes by












such that Δω > 0P . Assume for example an investor who requires means of payments
equivalent to a wealth Δω = δa
pa
. Then the providerʼs wealth changes by
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How could such a concept help to overcome the issue of credit crunches commonly
associated with full reserve banking systems? In a conventional system with 100% reserve
requirements, a borrower has to find someone who is actually willing to part with his money for
a certain time. This is not the case in a fractional reserve banking system in which the
commercial bank can accommodate the loan. In a system of money and antimoney, a buyer
would be able to accept antimoney instead of paying with money. Thus, if he wasnʼt able to find
the necessary ‘money funds’, a trade could still succeed if the seller—not the buyer—had
sufficient antimoney.
Another advantage lies in the nature of the liquidity market. In contrast to a system where
liquidity is provided by additional loan contracts, the price of liquidity is set at the moment of
transfer. In a conventional monetary system the price is determined by the payment of interest,
often fixed for a long time span, which carries with it the need for supervision and enforcing the
contractual agreements. Thus the legal overhead including time delays is non-negligible for a
single agent. In a symmetric monetary system, however, the provision of liquidity is as simple
as an ordinary act of purchase.
5. Symmetry considerations
Physical laws of motion are symmetric by nature and governed by the action principle. On the
other hand, bookkeeping is a memory of economic transfers, not a physical model of their
dynamics. The properties of economic exchange may influence the dynamics of the real
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Figure 4. The liquidity of an agent can be limited by either (a) its asset or (b) its liability
holdings. The blue line indicates the amount of money and antimoney that would be
transferred at a liquidity price ϕ. Here we have assumed ϕ > 1, i.e. a liquidity provider
P would choose to transfer more liability units than asset units. His profit then depends
on the equilibrium exchange rate eeq.
economy and are subject to social choice. We will discuss whether the rules of exchange are
invariant under certain transformations. As expected from the physical Noether theorem, also
economic transaction rules imply conservation laws if they obey certain symmetries. As we will
see, the stability of the unit of account and the elimination of non-local transfers is linked to the
time homogeneity of a monetary system. Notably, this finding does not imply an action
principle in bookkeeping, i.e. a close analogy between mechanics and the nature of economic
transactions.
The conservation of either the asset units or the liability units in a transfer is guaranteed by
the realization principle. It expresses value conservation by stating that revenue—a gain in
assets or loss in liabilities—should only be recognized when an enforceable claim against
another party exists to receive the revenue [48]. The realization principle is a consequence of
symmetry under exchange of trading roles. Let






t( ) ( ) ( )
denote the account balance of agent i before (t = 1) and after (t = 2) the transfer. The claim is
that p is conserved if the transfer is invariant under an exchange of transfer roles, that is, under
index permutation πij. Letʼs write a transfer from →i j as
Δ Δ− + + = +p p p p . (18)
i i j j i j
(1) (1) (2) (2)
This does not say anything about conservation yet; it may well be that Δ Δ≠i j and hence
+ ≠ +p p p p
i j i j
(2) (2) (1) (1). Applying πij to both sides gives Δ Δ− + + = +p p p pj j i i j i
(1) (1) (2) (2). The
sum +p p
j i
(2) (2) has obviously not changed; the left hand sides however are only equal if Δ Δ=j i
and hence only if ∑p is conserved. Note that it is not necessary for either i or j to actually hold
Δ: as long as Δ Δ=i j, the total ∑p is conserved. It is important to understand that this does not
prohibit the creation of new asset–liability pairs, e.g. by the creation of credit.
The conservation of the total amount of monetary units, i.e. either the sum of all assets or
the sum of all liabilities is not ensured by a principle in bookkeeping. This indicates that time
homogeneity can be systematically violated in bookkeeping. As we saw in figure 3, this leads to
problems when new monetary units are created.
Assume two agents hold +a t a t( ) ( )i j at t. We shift the system—the holdings a t l t( ), ( )i i —
by δt: δ δ+ = + ∂a t t a t a t( ) ( )i i t i and δ δ+ = + ∂a t t a t a t( ) ( )j j t j . If there is no transfer in
δ+t t t( , ), the derivatives are zero; otherwise

































which expresses conservation of asset units across time and transfers. An equivalent expression
can be derived for liability accounts li. If the quantity of money—either the asset units ∑ am m or
the liability units ∑ l
m m
—is not conserved, new money can be created during transfer. Due to
momentum conservation it is created as a pair and we find ∂ = ∂a lt i t j. A corollary of equation
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(20) is that the payer needs to get hold of the assets before the transfer. Since >a t( ) 0i ∀ i t, ,
we have Δ>a t( )i for all transfers Δ from →i j. Thus some transfers fail only because liquidity
is lacking. Under time homogeneity, a stricter order of transfers is enforced as liquidity has to be
obtained from other agents before the transfer.
6. Time-homogeneous money in random economies
In order to make predictions about economic quantities in a monetary system, we need a model
that describes the interactions between market participants. As human behavior is notoriously
hard, if not impossible, to capture in models, a growing amount of research in this field has
focused on random economies in which agents exchange random amounts of money, much like
particles exchange energy [3, 7–9]. This reflects the fact that the environment of an economy
and the future of investments are hard to predict also for the agents—in the extreme case the
environment can be considered fully random. Surprisingly, such an economic null model
correctly predicts monetary wealth distributions for all but the richest subpopulation [3].
Moreover, it is a challenging test bed to probe the stability of monetary systems [7, 49].
We study the time-homogeneous monetary system proposed in the previous section with
the model of a random economy. Agents exchange random amounts xi of asset and liability











where ∈i a l{ , } and p
i
is the respective price level. That particular choice is motivated by
private observations [11] which confirm that in real economies transfers with low prices are
encountered much more often than high prices. However, the distribution of transfer prices is
not critical to the outcome: Dragulescu and Yakovenko have shown that the equilibrium
monetary distribution in a closed single currency system is given by a Boltzmann–Gibbs
distribution for a wide range of random transfer schemes, namely those that have time-reversal
symmetry [9]. If we consider the money and antimoney holdings to be independent of each
other (i.e. if we disregard the liquidity providing mechanism introduced in the previous section),

















where ∈i a l{ , }. The parameter =Ti
M
N
i , with Mi being the total amount of asset or liability units
and N being the number of market participants, is equivalent to a temperature in statistical
physics. The corresponding simulation in figure 5(a) confirms this expectation. In contrast to a
single currency economy, the wealth distribution is now distinct from the money distribution.
Let ωP a l( , , ) be the probability of finding an agent with wealth ω, a assets and l liabilities.
Considering that the probability distributions of a and l are only well-defined for positive
values, the marginal probability of finding an agent with wealth ω is:
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Figure 5. Money and wealth distributions with (c), (d) and without (a), (b) a liquidity
market (LM). (a) In a random economy without liquidity transfer, asset and liability
holdings both equilibrate to a Boltzmann–Gibbs distribution. (b) According to equation





thus be asymmetric. The black lines in (b) were calculated using equations (23) and 24)
whereas points represent random transfer simulations with N = 100 000 agents. (c), (d)
Simulation results with a LM. (c) Except for two outliers with no assets or liabilities, the
distribution of assets and liabilities still largely follows an exponential law with
effective temperatures ≠T M
N
. (d) If a liquidity market is present (shown for ϕ = 2 and
ϕ = 5), the resulting wealth distribution is broader than in the case of no liquidity
trading. With large ϕ, the wealth distribution becomes increasingly asymmetric. For
simplicity, the simulation was performed using =p p
a l
and =T Ta l .
So we see that the wealth in a symmetric monetary system with a random economy is
distributed according to a Laplace distribution (see also figure 5(b)). Interestingly, this
distribution is very similar to the one found in a system with fractional reserve banking [8]. This
is to be expected since both models impose a cap on global dept by limiting the total number of


























In order to prevent agents from accumulating an unlimited amount of antimoney, it could
seem sensible to additionally impose a cap on individual debt. In that case, the wealth
distribution is cut off at some ω̂. The resulting wealth distributions are shown in figure 6. As
will be discussed later, there are other ways to prevent the hoarding of antimoney. The
percentage of creditors in a symmetric system without individual debt caps, i.e. the percentage
























Of course, we find that + =ω ω> <P P 10 0 .
7. Probability of successful trades
We would like to analyze the trading success of the agents. Even within a random model
economy, this quantity can give hints on whether or not a monetary system is prone to credit
crunches. Let us have a look on the fraction f
1
of agents who can pay an amount Δm in a single
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Figure 6. Monetary wealth distribution with debt caps ω̂ on individual debt. The
underlying asset distribution remains unchanged, but the liability distribution changes
its temperature due to the cutoff. As credit creation is prohibited in a symmetric system,
the global debt is restricted to the total amount of antimoney. The simulation was











( ) exp . (28)
1
In the time-homogeneous system, a trade that would fail if carried out via asset units could still
succeed through the payment with liabilities. If we assume = =p p 1
a l
for simplicity, the
fraction of agents who can pay Δm is doubled:







( ) 2 exp . (29)
3
Contrary to what one might expect, this differs from a doubling of the money supply to


















are depicted in figure 7 along with simulation results. For prices
lower than Δ =m T2 ln 2, the time-homogeneous monetary system—even without trading
liquidity—increases the chances for a successful trade compared to a single currency system
with = ·′T T2 .
In a closed single currency economy with exponentially distributed prices, the number of
successful trades can be calculated quite easily. With *p being the price level and T being the
temperature of the single currency, we get
∫ ∫ Δ= = +* * *Δ














Figure 8(a) shows that this fits the simulation data very well. In a time-homogeneous,
symmetric system without a liquidity market, the calculation can still be done analytically. Let
Δ ΔP S m( , , , )a l be the joint probability that the transfer prices in a trade are Δa and Δl,
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Figure 7. Fraction of agents Δf m( ) who can pay Δm or more. Note that for prices lower
than Δ =m T2 ln 2, a symmetric monetary system with a total money supply
= ·M T N is advantageous even to a single currency system with ′ = ·M M2 . In this
case we chose T = 10 and have assumed =p p
a l
. The black lines are calculated
according to equations (28), (30) and (29), whereas points represent simulation results
with N = 100 000 agents.
respectively, that the trade is successful and that transfer mode m is chosen. There are three
different transfer modes: either the trade is carried out via asset units or via liability units or the
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If both Δa and Δl are independently drawn from equation (21), i.e. if
Δ Δ Δ Δ= ·P P P( , ) ( ) ( ), (33)a l a l
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Figure 8. (a) Fraction of successful trades in a closed single currency random economy
and in a time-homogeneous, symmetric system, both with exponentially distributed
transfer prices. The black lines are calculated according to (31) and (36). As one would
expect, higher price levels lead to less successful trades since agents simply do not
possess enough means of payment to carry out the trades. Due to the additional payment
mode, a system of money and antimoney leads to a higher number of successful trades.
With the liquidity market switched on, the fraction of successful trades increases even
further as agents can now easily obtain means of payment. (b) The fraction of successful
trades in a symmetric, time-homogeneous system without a liquidity market for two
different price distributions Δ ΔP ( , )a l . The points represent simulation data and the
black lines are calculated according to (34) and (36). Of course, in all cases the fraction
of failing trades is ¯ = −f f1 . The simulation was performed with 10 000 agents and
= =T T 8a l .
A more realistic scenario would be that prices are connected through an exchange rate e as
introduced in the third section:
Δ Δ δ Δ
Δ




⎠P e P( , ) ( ). (35)a l l
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Both cases are depicted in figure 8(b) together with the corresponding simulation results which
confirm the analytic solution. In the next section we will see that the introduction of a liquidity
market leads to a significantly increased number of successful trades.
8. The liquidity market
So far we did not make use of the liquidity providing mechanism possible in a time-
homogeneous, symmetric system and impossible in a single currency system. Now we switch
on the liquidity market such that agents who possess liquidity according to equation (16) will
provide it to agents whose trades would otherwise fail because neither the asset holdings of the
buyer nor the liability holdings of the seller are sufficient to execute the transfer.
The specific implementation is such that we keep a list of potential liquidity providers and
their liquidity. If a trade can neither be executed via money nor antimoney, the buyer will
randomly ask agents on that list until the trade can either be realized or there are no more
liquidity providers left. In the latter case the trade ultimately fails. We start with the most simple
assumption that the price ϕ of liquidity is exogenously given in the simulation. Before we turn
to the results of the simulation, let us first calculate the probability of finding an agent who















As can be seen from figure 9, this describes the simulation results very well. If we now allow
liquidity trading, the amount of ‘free’ liquidity decreases sharply as it is all used up in trades.
Switching on the liquidity market also changes the money and wealth distribution. When
comparing figures 5(c), (d) with figures 5(a), (b), one can see that the resulting distributions
with a liquidity market can still be described by exponential functions except for two ‘outliers’
in the upper left corner. The outliers represent the liquidity providers who are left with little
asset and liability holdings and the buyers of initially failing trades who had to turn to the
liquidity market. They end up with smaller asset but larger liability holdings. For the remaining
agents we see that the effective temperatures of the fitted exponential distributions (see equation




Figure 10(a) shows the effective temperatures of assets and liabilities for various prices of
liquidity ϕ. In figure 10(b) we have plotted three asset distributions to illustrate the effect. For
the liability distributions one would find the reverse effect, i.e. the slopes get shallower with
increasing ϕ. As can be seen from figure 5(d), the wealth distribution is broadened if liquidity
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Figure 9. The amount of free liquidity in a time-homogeneous, symmetric random
economy with and without a liquidity market. Both (a) and (b) show the same data with
different scalings for the y-axis. The simulation was performed using 10 000 agents
= =T T 100a l and = =p p 200a l . With increasing ϕ, insufficient liability holdings
become the limiting factor for an agentʼs liquidity according to equation (16). A
liquidity market leads to a rapid redistribution of excess liquidity. Note that for =p p
a l
,
prices ϕ < 1 would probably not be encountered in a real economy as this would
constitute a loss of monetary wealth for the liquidity provider. The smaller ϕ, the longer
it takes to reach low free liquidity levels. This effect can still be seen for the data point
that corresponds to ϕ = 0.01. The black lines were calculated according to equation
(37).
Figure 10. (a) Effective temperatures for different liquidity prices. ϕ = 0 is the case of
no liquidity market. Note that even for high values of ϕ, the asset and liability
distributions will always be broader than in the case of no liquidity trading. Asset and
liability temperatures diverge with increasing ϕ as the wealth distributions in figure 5(d)
become increasingly asymmetric. In (b) we have plotted the asset distribution for three
different liquidity prices ϕ for better illustration of the phenomenon. Note that for
increasing ϕ the slope becomes steeper which corresponds to a lower temperature. For
the liability distribution one finds the reverse effect (only shown in (a)).
trading is enabled. However, for larger values of ϕ, the wealth distribution becomes
increasingly asymmetric, seen in the divergence of the effective temperatures Ta and Tl (see
figure 10). This makes sense, since buyers of liquidity have to accept more liabilities than assets







Naturally, the price of liquidity ϕ = δδ
l
a
also reflects the price levels and thus ϕ and the exchange
rate e are expected to be tightly connected and probably inversely proportional. However, such
expectations have to be tested in real economies.
As a final observation, we see from figure 8(a) that the fraction of successful trades is
increased when a liquidity market is present. This is to be expected as agents who initially lack
liquidity can now turn to the liquidity market and obtain means of payment. Due to the spot
trade property, i.e. the absence of long-term contracts (see section 4), this mechanism should be
able to alleviate the problem of credit crunches and delayed feedback loops from long-term
credit contracts in real systems.
9. Discussion
We analyzed a monetary system of money and antimoney that has only recently become
possible with the advent of mobile computers and cryptography. One of the motivations are the
non-local effects of credit creation. Once a payment is performed by the creation of credit, the
on-setting inflation has an effect on all other market participants. Credit holders profit from the
monetary inflation while money holders suffer from the inflation. As a result, the decision
between two credit partners influences all other market participants without their consent and
without a mechanism to counteract.
Therefore, credit creates a moral hazard. Products are bought by credit creation at price
levels before the inflationary effect of the credit and can be sold later at higher price levels after
the market equilibrated to the inflationary pulse. This phenomenon can be seen in the
contemporary credit crisis. While a small number of banks have profited from the created credit
bubble, the resulting crisis is endured by market participants world-wide. It is quite likely that
the moral hazard leads to an overboarding credit creation and eventually to periodic debt
defaults.
As shown, the proposed monetary structure can prevent this. It is borrowed from the
physics of energy and momentum conservation [11] and is inspired by the Noether theorem of
time homogeneity. Instead of relying on interest rates to judge the future value of past
investments at the time of credit creation, a local exchange rate dynamically compares values of
the past (debt = antimoney) with values of the future (savings = money). This judgment is
performed in real time by all market participants in any monetary transaction, in stark contrast
to interest rate determinations which are judged locally by the subjects of credit creation and
typically hold for finite time spans.
The differences from the existing monetary system are rather subtle. Money and
antimoney units are normalized to the number of subjects in an economic space. This means
that both money and antimoney are issued upon entering and collected upon leaving the
economic space. Importantly, money and credit are issued in differing units or currencies. Their
mutual value is judged by an exchange rate.
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A real implementation of a time-homogeneous, symmetric monetary system has only
recently become conceivable with the advent of electronic payment systems. Since the agentʼs
liability units (antimoney) constitute an obligation to render goods or services to society, agents
will want to get rid of it. It is obvious that such a system will require one way or another to
make the individual antimoney holdings transparent. One would have to make sure that no
agent exclusively consumes by accumulating antimoney without ever passing it on to other
agents, i.e. without contributing to society. Money on the other hand would not need similarly
strict monitoring. For the liquidity market to be efficient, money should preferably be as easily
transferable as antimoney. Such a differentiation between money and antimoney would already
be possible today: money consists of bank liabilities and non-bank assets while antimoney is
memorized as bank assets and non-bank liabilities. Both units are never added or subtracted
during monetary transactions and are structurally a money currency and a debt currency [7].
The history of debt is laden with ways of how creditors enforce the payback of loans. An
overview from anthropology was recently provided [15]. One rather inelegant possible solution,
already discussed in figure 6, would be to impose a debt cap, i.e. transfers would only be
allowed if the payerʼs wealth did not drop below a certain threshold ω̂. Another solution would
be to assign time-stamps to antimoney which would determine the period within which the
antimoney had to be passed along. This could also be achieved by an electronic
implementation. Similar to contemporary structures of inheritance after death, money insurance
schemes havee to distribute the risk of subjects leaving the economic space. In this case the
same money and antimoney units previously issued upon entering have to be collected. Irving
Fisher suggested to choose the amount of central bank money proportional to the total number
of market participants [40], an approach that we implemented in our simulations.
The question is whether a market mechanism alone could prevent agents from hoarding
antimoney. Closely related to this point is the issue of bankruptcy and defaults. It turns out that
the legal framework is likely to be similar to todayʼs rules. If an agent had acquired some good
by receiving antimoney and went bankrupt afterwards, i.e. he would be unable to pass on the
antimoney within the set time window, the seller had to take the antimoney back and would in
turn become responsible again for passing it on. This is the equivalent of a write-off today.
Thus, the negotiation of antimoney prices would depend on the buyerʼs economic standing. For
large transaction volumes, financial service providers could provide insurance against an
agentʼs default. Similar to contemporary regulations which implement rules for personal
default, an insurance against leaving the system with improper and imbalanced money and
antimoney holdings could be implemented. We expect that the exchange rate dynamics between
money and antimoney allow other modes of handling liabilities which are not yet conceived
from our traditional monetary background using credit and interest.
In the analysis of statistical monetary economies, it is typically assumed that the amount of
money is fixed. For this case, it was found early on, that the money distribution follows an
exponential Boltzmann distribution [3, 9]. However the quantity of money is not fixed in a
modern economy and a free running credit economy leads to a self-contradictory inflation
dynamics which can only be kept in check with systematic transfers [7]. Thus statistical
economies are very good in checking the robustness of economic systems.
If these transfers are derived from a potential, the Boltzmann distribution can be
generalized. Similarly, the mechanism on how a random transfers are forbidden to ensure a
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fixed quantity of money leads to a predictable wealth distribution. If the amount of money is
fixed in a random fractional reserve economy, again an exponential distribution is found [8].
With the above results it comes as no surprise that also for the case of a money–antimoney
system, since it fixes the amount of money and antimoney, an exponential wealth distribution is
found. However, due to the separation of monies, the negative and positive side of the
distribution are independent from each other and follows the respective price levels (figure 5).
Even if we enforce a fixed debt cap, the exponential wealth distribution only shifts to the left
(figure 6). This simple result allowed us to show that also the distribution of agents who could
offer ‘credit’ by transfer of liquidity—by a simultaneous transfer of money and antimoney—is
exponentially distributed (figure 7). We can therefore infer the behavior of the liquidity market
in a random money–antimoney economy (equation (36)).
The above results give a solid basis for the subsequent analysis of a liquidity market. If
agents are allowed to trade money–antimoney packets with a price of liquidity ϕ, liquidity is
very effectively cleared from the market as seen in figure 9. The width of the money distribution
is specified with effective temperatures. We find that with the increased flexibility of the
liquidity market, the wealth distribution becomes broader (see figures 5(c), (d)). The price of
liquidity introduces a small asymmetry into the distributions. We see that the possibility of the
liquidity market offers creditary flexibility, but still the distributions converge towards an
exponential Boltzmann-like distribution in a random economy, indicating the overall stability of
such a system.
How would the market change the prices of antimoney with respect to the prices in money
units? At this time we can only speculate and possibly the only answer to this question lies in
setting up a suitable experimental setting to probe the dynamics of the exchange rate between
the two currencies money and antimoney. The hope and expectation is that the dynamics map to
the known structure of the dynamics of two competing currencies of two countries. But without
further experimental analysis, we can only speculate on whether the exchange rate between
money and antimoney together with the liquidity market could establish a stable market
equilibrium by itself. Both the historical record [15] and the most recent credit crises have
shown at length that a creditary economy is not providing society a stable market equilibrium.
10. Conclusion
We have introduced a new bi-currency system of money and antimoney that allows exploiting
the advantages of full reserve banking systems without giving up easy access to liquidity. Since
economic experiments to test the approach are difficult to conduct, we first test the approach
within an economic scheme of random transfers. Such stochastic analysis is a good stress test to
probe the stability of a monetary system. We provide a number of analytical solutions within
that framework. We find that due to the symmetry of the system it is possible for agents to
provide liquidity to other market participants without the need for overseeing and enforcing
long-term credit contracts on a personal level. This novel mechanism allows one to host a time-
symmetric monetary system without inhibiting credit dynamics which would be the case in
time-homogeneous systems with only one kind of money.
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